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Judicial Application of Strict Liability Local
Ordinances
Guyora Binder & Brenner Fissell
The criminal code reform movement inspired by the Model Penal Code
had, among other goals, the aim of eliminating strict liability offenses.' The
success of the movement resulted in the enactment of the Model Penal Code's
scheme of element analysis and default culpability terms in about half of
American jurisdictions.2 Around the same time, though, a similar reform
movement was occurring in local government law: the home rule movement,
which advocated for greater political power for municipalities-including the
power to criminalize conduct.3
When one looks at the state of much of local criminal law today, one might
conclude that these two reform movements were ships that passed in the
night. Many local ordinances dispense with the Model Penal Code's analytic
terminology, and most significantly, many of their offense definitions
identify no culpability element whatsoever.4 Consider the following offense
from Los Angeles, California:
No person shall urinate or defecate in or upon any public street,
sidewalk, alley, plaza, beach, park, public building or other publicly
maintained facility or place, or in any place open to the public or
1.
Darryl K. Brown, CriminalLaw Reform andthe Persistenceof StrictLiability, 62 DUKE
L.J. 285, 287-88 (2012) (explaining that the "two ambitions" of the project were "to bring
analytical clarity to the definition and interpretation of criminal statutes" and to "reject[ ] strict
liability for any element of a crime" (footnote omitted)).
2.
Id. at 294 (counting twenty-four jurisdictions with an "identifiable variation" of MPC
section 2.02(3), which requires recklessness for any objective element assigned no mental state,
and section 2.02(4), which distributes any mental state in the offense definition to all elements).
Because of our focus on local ordinances dispensing with culpability terms altogether, our
analysis focuses on jurisdictions with a provision analogous to MPC section 2.02(1), the
requirement that every objective element be assigned a culpable mental state, or section 2.02(3).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. L. INST. 1985). Some state codes, notably California's,
preceded and may have influenced the MPC in adopting such a requirement of culpability. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 2021) (enacted 1872).
3.
David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2326 (2003)
(describing a "second wave" of home rule reforms spurred by American Municipal Association's
1953 model home rule provision). The ten-year process of drafting the Model Penal Code began
in 1951. See generallyJerome Hall, The ProposalTo Preparea Model PenalCode, 4 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 91(1951) (discussing the theory and research needed for the proposed Model Penal Code).
4.
See Brenner M. Fissell, Local Offenses, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 841-42, 866-67
(2020) (listing examples).
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exposed to public view, except when using a urinal, toilet or
commode located in a restroom, or when using a portable or
temporary toilet or other facility designed for the sanitary disposal
of human waste and which is enclosed from public view.'

Read literally, such an offense would create liability for the spontaneous
incontinence of a public beachgoer.
These strict liability local offenses proliferate even in the many states that
reformed their codes according to the Model Penal Code's goals. Home rule
has frustrated the purposes of the code reformers by facilitating the creation
of a vast subterranean body of misdemeanors that exists below the core state
code. In so far as strict liability should be minimized, this asymmetry between
modern state offense drafting and archaic local offense drafting is
problematic. But as all criminal lawyers know, the text of the statute is not
the last word on its meaning or application: judges interpret and apply the
statute. Can judges use these powers to ameliorate asymmetry between state
and local criminal law? This article will explore two judicial strategies for
doing so: construction of a mental element and preemption by state law.
Judges often can and sometimes must read a mental element into a
statutory offense definition silent as to culpability. Two classic Supreme
Court interpretations of federal law illustrate this possibility. In Baender v.
Barnett, the Court denied a due process challenge to a statute seemingly
punishing inadvertent possession of counterfeiting tools by reading a mental
element into the offense. 6 In Morissettev. UnitedStates, the Court overturned
a theft conviction where knowledge of the ownership of the property taken
was neither alleged nor required at trial, explaining that"mere omission from
[the offense] of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating
that element from the crimes denounced."' Many state judges similarly read
mental elements into statutory offense definitions otherwise silent as to
culpability.' We will see that many state codes invite judges to do so, even
when applying local criminal statutes.9 As Baender indicates, this maneuver
5.
L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 41.47.2 (2021).
6.
255 U.S. 224, 224-25 (1921).
7.
342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); see Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015)
("The fact thatthe statute does not specify any required mental state, however, does not mean that
none exists.").
8.
See generallyDannye Holley, CulpabilityEvaluationsin the State Supreme Courtsfrom
1977 to 1999: A "Model" Assessment, 34 AKRON L. REv. 401, 401 (2001) (assessing "the
performance of state supreme courts ... with regard to culpability evaluations"); Eric A. Johnson,
Rethinking the PresumptionofMens Rea, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 769, 769 (2012) (discussing
"courts' interpretations of criminal statutes, particularly where the subject of mens rea is
concerned").
9.
See discussion infra Part I.A.
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does not always favor the defense: judges may require culpability in avoiding
a due process challenge to strict liability."
Local offenses exist in the context of a superior body of state criminal law.
This means that a second doctrine is implicated when a local criminal case
comes before the judiciary: preemption." When reviewing claims of
intrastate preemption, most states utilize the major analytical categories
created by the U.S. Supreme Court in the federal-state context: express
preemption and implied preemption (due to "occupation of the field" or a
specific "conflict")." Preemption's effect on a strict liability local offense
will be different depending on the type of preemption a state has adopted;
field preemption would invalidate the offense, regardless of its mental
element; while, as we will see, the more prevalent form of preemption,
conflict preemption, would not invalidate an offense requiring less culpability
than a parallel state offense.13

I.

CONSTRUCTING MENS REA

We can begin by considering the jurisprudence of constructing mens rea.
After examining the state statutory frameworks governing interpretation of
local criminal ordinances, we will review cases assessing local criminal laws
silent as to culpability. We will see that regardless of whether codes
encourage such construction of culpability, courts generally adhere to the
analysis laid out in Morissette, where a multi-factor test is used to decide
whether a statutory offense imposes strict liability. 4 In so doing, courts
10. For due process limits on strict liability, see, for example, Lambert v. California, 355
U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957) (requiring notice of criminally enforced duties); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959) (requiring culpability with respect to circumstance rendering speech
unprotected); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,437 (1978) (identifyingMorissette
as an application of the doctrine of lenity possibly required by due process); Holdridge v. United
States, 282 F.2d 302, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1960) (reading Morissette's holding as required by due
process); United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding due process
precludes substantial penalty for one acting with an "innocent state of mind"); Alan C. Michaels,
ConstitutionalInnocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828 (1999) (synthesizing due process restrictions
on strict liability); GUYORA BINDER, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAw: CRIMINAL LAW
155-66 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2016) (same). On the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, see
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 324-25 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 62 (1932).
11. Paul Diller, IntrastatePreemption,87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2007).
12. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2103-07
(2000) (discussing federal categories); see also Diller, supranote 11, at 1140-42 (citing state law
and noting that "[d]espite some superficial distinctions, most states' preemption analyses are
similar in form to the federal model").
13. See discussion infra Part III.B.
14. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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frequently present this interpretive decision as a determination of legislative
intent. Finally, we will briefly turn to another doctrine that we might expect
to see invoked in constructing mental element in local offenses: the doctrine
of lenity." We will see why lenity is rarely invoked in interpreting state
criminal codes. But we will also see that these considerations are less
pertinent in interpreting local ordinances, particularly in states lacking
applicable culpability default rules
A. StatutoryLaw ofInterpretation
The Model Penal Code classifies offenses punishable by incarceration or
death as "crimes," and all other offenses as noncriminal "violations." 6 The
Code's section 2.02(1) requires a culpable mental state of at least negligence
corresponding to each objective offense element for every offense defined in
the Code, apart from certain exceptions set forth in Section 2.05.17 Section
2.05 in turn identifies two such exceptions: (1) violations defined in the Code,
and (2) any offense defined in another statute, clearly expressing a legislative
intent to impose strict liability with respect to an objective element, and
punished only as a violation. 18 In short, the Code bars strict liability crimes,
but permits strict liability violations. The official commentary on section 2.05
observes that "most strict liability offenses involve special regulatory
legislation, normally found in titles of a code other than the criminal title." 9
The comment expresses ambivalence regarding the interpretation of such
regulatory offenses.2 0 To be sure, it cites Morissette for the proposition that
silence regarding culpability should not be equated with strict liability." Yet
Morissette grudgingly acquiesces in attributing a legislative intent to impose
strict liability to regulatory offenses, particularly with lower penalties." And,
while condemning incarceration on the basis of strict liability, the MPC
comment similarly anticipates that courts will continue to treat regulatory

15. See generally Shon Hopwood, Two Sides of the Same Interpretive Coin: The
PresumptionofMens Rea andthe HistoricalRule ofLenity, 53 ARZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2021)
(discussing in part how the rule of lenity could be used to assist courts engaged in statutory
interpretation).
16. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.04(1), 1.04(5) (AM. L. INST. 1985).
17. Id. §2.02(1).
18. Id. §§ 2.05(1), 2.05(2)(a).
19. Id. § 2.05 cmt. 1, at 282-83.
20. See id. at 283.
21. Id. cmt. 3, at 293 & n.10.
22. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252-60 (1952).
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offenses as strict liability and permits them to do so on the basis of an
attribution of legislative intent, as long as the penalty is civil. 23
About half the state criminal codes have provisions analogous to Model
Penal Code section 2.02(1), establishing that at least some offenses silent as
to culpability nevertheless require culpable mental states. Three codes
provide that every crime requires intent or criminal negligence. 2 4 Another six
adopt Model Penal Code section 2.02(1), with an exception for crimes in
other codes manifesting a legislative intent to impose strict liability, or mildly
punished offenses, or both.15 Fifteen more adopt Model Penal Code section
2.02(1) with an exception for a clear statement or expression of legislative
intent, even for crimes defined within the code. 26 Two more states provide
that a statutory offense silent as to culpability will require culpability if the
conduct "necessarily involves" such culpability, and distributes any mental
state mentioned to all elements. Michigan has recently adopted MPC section
2.02(1), but only for newly enacted offenses outside the criminal code.2
Can such provisions be applied to local ordinances? Model Penal Code
section 1.05 provides that its general provisions "are applicable to offenses
defined by other statutes." 29 The commentary explains that these provisions
reflect "norms that ought to govern any application of penal sanctions" and
were "intended to simplify the problem of the courts" in applying any
criminal offense. 30 Recall that the commentary's discussion of strict liability
focuses on regulatory offenses outside the criminal code. Moreover, much

23. § 2.05 cmt. 2, at 291-92. There is no discussion of local offenses in particular. See id.
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 2021); IDAHO CODE § 18-114 (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. §
193.190 (2021).
25. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 702-204, -207, -212 (2021);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.030, .040, .050 (West 2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2 (2021);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.095(2), .105, .115(2) (2021); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 302(a)-(c), 305
(2021).
26. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-2-3, -4(b) (2021); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.600, .610(b) (2021);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-203(b), -204(b)-(c) (2021); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-3(a)-(b), 5/4-9
(2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5202(a), (d), (e), 21-5203 (2021); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 34(1),
(4) (2021); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 562.016, .021, .026 (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2103(1), -104 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(a), (c) (2021); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 15.10, .15
(McKinney 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(2), (3) (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2901.20, .21 (West 2021) (applying section 2901.20 only to offenses enacted after March 23,
2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301 (2021); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (West 2021); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-101, -102 (West 2021).
27. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202 (2021); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-502, -503 (2021).
28. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 8.9(3) (West 2021).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05(2) (AM. L. INST. 1985).
30. Id. § 1.05 cmt. 4, at 80-81.
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regulation was originally enacted at the local level, 3' and at least one strict
liability offense objected to in the Model Penal Code commentary was a local
one.32 Sixteen of the codes authorizing courts to construct the mental
elements of offenses have provisions analogous to Model Penal Code section
1.05.33 The culpability provisions in many of the remaining codes reference
crimes defined under other statutes or are phrased broadly enough to apply to
them.34
While a substantial minority of codes authorize courts to construct mental
elements for local criminal offenses, courts need no statutory authorization to
do so. As Baender and Morissette illustrate, courts can construct mental
elements on the basis of constitutional or common law principles or by
imputing legislative intent to require culpability. Even where codes invite
courts to construct mental elements for local ordinances, courts may turn to
caselaw in deciding whether to accept that invitation.

B. FactorTests for ImputingLegislative Intent
The most prevalent approach to the judicial application of strict liability
ordinances is a multi-factor test drawn from Morissette.35 That case was
31.

See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN

NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 66-70, 95-105 (1996) (describing legal prohibitions on wooden
buildings and gunpowder and the regulation of markets that developed in early American cities).
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1, at 284 (referencing People ex rel. Weisent v.
Mishkin, 11 N.Y.S.2d 77 (N.Y.C. Ct. Spec. Sess. 1939), aff'd sub nom. People v. Mishkin, 24
N.E.2d 22 (N.Y. 1939)).
33. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-102(D) (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-103(b) (2021);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-103(1) (2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 103(b) (2021); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 701-102(3) (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5103(b) (2021); Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.031(2)
(2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-1-103(2) (2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:9(I) (2021); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-5(b) (West 2021); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.05(2) (McKinney 2021); OR. REV.
STAT. § 161.035(2) (2021); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 107(a) (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11102(b) (2021); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.03(b) (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-103(1)
(West 2021).
34. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4 (2021) (referring to "a statute defining an offense"); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 20 (West 2021) (referring to "every crime or public offense"); IDAHO CODE § 18-114
(2021); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. 5/4-3 (2021) (stating that "a person is not guilty of an
offense"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2021) (referring to "a statute defining an
offense"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.190 (2021) (referring to "every crime or public offense"); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(2) (2021) (referring to "a statute or regulation ... defining a crime").
35. Otherthan the cases discussed in the main text, the following cases also apply a similar
analytic method: State v. Elmwood Terrace, Inc., 204 A.2d 379, 382-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1964) (determining that offense of failing to maintain apartment units at certain temperature
was valid strict liability offense); State v. Kiejdan, 437 A.2d 324, 327 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981) (determining that offense of failure to provide heat to apartment units was valid strict
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decided against the background of UnitedStates v. Balint. Balintis fairly read
as holding that due process permits strict liability for any criminal offense,
and as reasoning a public safety regulatory function provides evidence that
strict liability was legislatively intended. 36 Morissette is fairly read as holding
that a legislative intent to impose strict liability should not be presumed for
"infamous common law crimes"37 while suggesting that due process might
forbid strict liability for such offenses. 38 In addition to emphasizing their
legislative origins, the Court characterized offenses that could be presumed
strict as regulatory in function. Such offenses were typically
not . . positive aggressions or invasions . . but . . neglect where
the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many
violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury
to person or property, but merely create the danger or probability of
it .... The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a
position to prevent it with no more care than society might
reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably
exact from one who assumed his responsibilities. Also, penalties
commonly are relatively small. 39

Although Morissette's elusive multi-factor standard is controlling
authority only for interpreting federal criminal statutes, it may be attractive
to state courts for two reasons. First, it affords courts broad discretion.
Second, its hints concerning due process make a citation to Morissette an
attractive safe harbor for courts concerned about constitutional challenges.
These considerations may make Morissette'smulti-factor test particularly
attractive in states without culpability default rules in their codes. In the
Nebraska case of State v. Ruisi, the defendant was sentenced to six months'

liability

offense); State v. Ruisi, 616 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000) (determining that
offense of harboring dangerous and unvaccinated dog, resulting in a conviction and sentence of
six months incarceration and six months of probation, was valid strict liability offense); Delfino
v. Sloan, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 269 (Ct. App. 1993) (determining that offense of allowing dog to
run loose was valid strict liability offense); People v. Optimal Glob. Healing, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr.
3d 913, 922-24 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2015) (determining that offense of operating medical
marijuana dispensary was valid strict liability offense); Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.
City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600, 610-12 (6th Cir. 2005) (applyingMorissetteto hold that permit
requirement for parade participation could not validly be punished using strict liability, mostly
because of peculiar First Amendment implications).
36. See 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
37. 342 U.S. 246, 252, 260-62 (1952).
38. See id. at 260 ("Neither this Court nor, so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken
to delineate a precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes
that require a mental element and crimes that do not. We attempt no closed definition, for the law
on the subject is neither settled nor static. The conclusion reached in the Balintand Behrman cases
has our approval and adherence for the circumstances to which it was there applied.").
39. Id. at 255-56.
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probation plus a six-month suspended sentence for the crime of harboring a
dangerous dog, defined by Omaha's municipal code. 40 One of his three large
guard dogs attacked and mauled a social guest when the defendant was out
of the room. 4 ' The injuries were significant, requiring over 200 stitches and
reconstructive facial surgery. 42 The trial court construed the offense as one of
strict liability, thereby precluding the defendant from arguing that he had no
notice of the dog's dangerousness. 43 Ruisi argued on appeal that such strict
liability violated due process. 44 The Nebraska Court of Appeals rested its
analysis on a Nebraska Supreme Court decision and an Eighth Circuit
decision, both using the Morissette factors as a test of due process:
In State v. Pettit, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated: "'Strict
liability offenses are the exception rather than the rule and will only
be found where there is a clear legislative intent not to require any
degree of mens rea."' However, the court went on to state that the
violation of some criminal statutes may occur without a defendant's
criminal intent, if such law
"omits mention of intent and where it seems to involve what is
basically a matter of policy, where the standard imposed is, under
the circumstances, reasonable and adherence thereto properly
expected of a person, where the penalty is relatively small, where
the conviction does not gravely besmirch, where the statutory crime
is not taken over from the common law, and where congressional
purpose is supporting, the statute can be construed as one not
requiring criminal intent. The elimination of this element is then not
violative of the due process clause." 45

The Ruisi court noted that a state statute imposed civil strict liability on
dog owners for injuries, reasoned that this reflected a state policy of
protecting the public against such injuries, and concluded:
We find that the same public policy is carried through in Omaha's
criminal "harboring" ordinance as there is no express provision for
prior knowledge or criminal intent.
To find in the ordinance a mens rea requirement of criminal intent,
or even a requirement of negligence on the part of the dog owner,
would defeat the ordinance's public policy, which is to protect
40. 616 N.W.2d at 23.
41. Id. at 22-23.
42. Id. at 23.
43. Id. at 26.
44. Id. at 23-24.
45. Id. at 24-25 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Pettit, 445 N.W.2d 890, 897-98 (Neb.
1989), in turn quoting Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960)).
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people from the great harm which can befall a victim of a dog
attack. 46

Thus, the imputed legislative intent does double duty, both supporting the
strict liability interpretation of the statute and supplying one of the criteria
satisfying due process under the test endorsed in Pettit and Holdridge.
A decision using a similar method to reach a different result is the
Minnesota case of State v. Betz. 47 Betz was convicted of violating a city
ordinance by maintaining an improperly paved parking area on his property
and was sentenced to a year's probation.48 Although affirming the conviction,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals accepted his contention that this offense
requires a culpable mental state. 49 Relying on a Minnesota Supreme Court
case that in turn quoted Morissette and Staples v. United States (a leading
case applying Morissette), the court reasoned that strict liability required a
clear legislative intent because "strict liability statutes are generally
disfavored." 5 The court continued that in State v. Arkell, the state supreme
court had
held that public-welfare or regulatory offenses are not subject to the
presumption that intent is required to establish liability because a
"defendant knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a
character that places him 'in responsible relation to public danger,'
[and therefore] he should be alerted to the probability of strict
regulation."5

The Betz court then added that Arkell had determined that violations of a
building code did not pose sufficiently obvious danger to defeat the
presumption of a mental element.52 A fortiori, a law punishing the failure to
pave a private parking space should be presumed to require proof of fault.53
While Morissette's factor test fills an interpretive gap in state codes
without culpability default rules, it seems that a presumption of culpability
should obviate its use. An example is provided by the 2008 Ohio case of City

46. Id. at 25-26.
47. See No. A09-793, 2010 WL 1190524, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2010).
48. Id. at *1.
49. Id. at *3, *6.
50. Id. at *2 (quoting In re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 805-06 (Minn. 2000))
(relying on Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994) in turn relying on Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 249-50 (1952)).
51. Id. at *2 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Arkell, 672 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Minn.
2003), in turn quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 601).
52. Id. at*3.
53. Id.
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of Dayton v. Becker. 4 Becker successfully argued that an ordinance
punishing failure to comply with a housing inspector's order required proof
of his recklessness. The court relied on the penal code's presumption of
culpability:
"When the section defining an offense does not specify any degree
of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict
criminal liability for the conduct described in the section, then
culpability is not required for a person to be guilty of the offense.
When the section neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates
a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is sufficient
culpability to commit the offense." 5

The court then invoked a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court holding "[i]t is
not enough thatthe General Assembly in fact intended imposition of liability
without proof of mental culpability. Rather the General Assembly
must plainly indicate that intention in the language of the statute."5 6 Finding
no expression of such an intention in the language of the statute, the court
assigned a mental state of recklessness.
Yet other courts have relied on Morissette's factor test, even when their
state codes gave clear guidance. California courts in particular have found
Morissette's balancing test more commodious than section 20 of California's
1850 Penal Code, which boldly proclaims that "in every crime . . there must
exist a union . . . of act and intent, or criminal negligence." 57 It might be
argued that strict liability criminal statutes can supersede section 20 as later
in time, although one might then expect such statutes to explicitly announce
an exception to section 20. California courts have instead interpreted section
20 as merely invoking a preexisting common law principle that courts are
presumably free to modify. In People v. Dillard, an appellate court upheld
the imposition of strict liability for carrying a loaded weapon in public,
against arguments that doing so violated due process as well as section 20.58
Interpreting section 20 as expressing a common law principle, the court
quoted Balint and Morissette at length and thereby suggested that the
common law principle had evolved, or perhaps had never applied to
regulatory offenses. Applying Morissette to justify strict liability, the court
54. City of Dayton v. Becker, No. 22107, 2008 WL 1921677 (Ohio Ct. App. May 2, 2008).
The offense is a third-degree misdemeanor punishable by up to sixty days injail. DAYTON, OHIO
CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 93.99, 130.99 (2021). The decision appears to have provoked the
subsequent addition of language to section 93.99 expressly imposing strict liability.
55. Becker, 2008 WL 1921677, at *5 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B) (West
2021)).
56. Id. (quoting State v. Collins, 733 N.E.2d 1118, 1122 (Ohio 2000)).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 2021) (emphasis added).
58. 201 Cal. Rptr. 136, 136 (Ct. App. 1984).
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invoked not only the danger of the conduct, but the legislature's
characterization of the statute, the 1967 Mulford Act, as "necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace" from "the increased incidence of
organized groups . . . publicly arming themselves." 59
In People v. Optimal Global Healing, Inc., a California court applied
similar reasoning to a local ordinance punishing the operation of medical
marijuana dispensaries in certain areas with up to six months in jail. 60 The
court drew on an earlier decision's multi-factor test for identifying a "public
welfare offense," derived from the LaFave & Scott treatise. 61 This test treated
any "general provision on mens rea or strict liability crimes" as just another
factor. 62 The Optimal Global Healing court relied on such factors as a low
punishment, the "severity of the . . public harm," the ordinance's silence as
to culpability, the difficulty and inconvenience to the prosecution of proving
culpability, and the publicity of the regulations violated. 63
California's reliance onMorissette'sflexible standard might be explained
by the age and sweep of its statutory requirement of culpability, leaving no
exception even for explicit impositions of strict liability. Thus, we might
expect courts in Model Penal Code jurisdictions to follow the simpler
approach of the Ohio courts, imposing strict liability only when explicitly
required to. Yet recall that the Model Penal Code's requirement of culpability
excepts offenses outside the code on the basis of "legislative purpose" (albeit
"plainly" apparent). 64
Courts in Model Penal Code jurisdictions have turned to the Morissette
factors in constructing legislative intent. Consider a 1999 case from the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals: Aguirre v. State.65 The City of El Paso
promulgated an ordinance in 1987 making it a misdemeanor offense to "own,
operate or conduct any business in an adult bookstore, adult motion picture
theater or nude live entertainment club" within 1,000 feet of certain types of
59. Id. at 138. On the Mulford Act as a response to the Black Panther Party, see generally
Adam
Winkler,
The
Secret
History of Guns,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/
[https://perma.cc/7QPB-FNLF]; David Caraccio, From the Pagesofthe Bee, 1967: Armed Black
Panthers
Invade
Capitol,
SACRAMENTO
BEE,
https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/history/article148667224.html
[https://perma.cc/V7DQERMY].
60. See People v. Optimal Glob. Healing, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 913 (App. Dep't Super. Ct.
2015).
61. See id. at 922-23 (quoting In re Jorge M., 4 P.3d 297, 301 (Cal. 2000)) (citing 1 LAFAVE
& SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.8(a), at 342-44 (1986)).
62. Optimal Glob. Healing, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
63. Id. at 923.
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(1)(b) (AM. L. INST. 1985).
65. 22 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
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establishments (churches, schools, parks, etc.). 66 The defendant was
employed as a performer at a nude strip club located within 1,000 feet of a
parochial school; she was cited for violation of the ordinance and fined
$500.67 The court upheld the dismissal below of the charge for failure to
allege a culpable mental state with respect to the proximity of the school. 68
The court observed that section 6.02 of the Texas Penal Code provides "[i]f
the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable
mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses with
any mental element" and imposes a default culpable mental state of
recklessness. 69 While the statute's silence as to culpability left in place the
statutory presumption that culpability was required, the court nevertheless
considered "whether such an intent is manifested by other features of the
statute."70 The court considered the primary factor to be whether the statute
protected "public health, safety or welfare." It explained this criterion with
lengthy quotes from Morissette and LaFave & Scott." While conceding that
the ordinance was a business regulation with a low penalty, the court
emphasized its focus on morals rather than safety and its application to
employees as factors militating against strict liability.
A New Jersey court employed a similar analysis, but with a different
result, in the 1981 case of State v. Kiejdan.73 The defendant, a landlord, was
fined seventy-five dollars for each failure to provide heat to a tenant on a
given day under a town Board of Health ordinance. 74 The defendant professed
that his violations had been unintentional, as his maintenance of the heating
system had been subverted by vandalism.75 The court classified the ordinance
as a public welfare offense for which strict liability was appropriate, citing a
66. Id. at 464.
67. See id. The light punishment in this case did not cause the court to avoid the deeper
implications of strict liability.
Texas penal law has not decriminalized strict liability offenses. Many are Class
C misdemeanors, a conviction for which does not impose any legal disability
or disadvantage. But the offenses are still crimes, and "the fact is that the
person charged can be arrested on warrant like any ordinary criminal, forced
to travel a long distance to attend the court, remanded in custody and
imprisoned in default of payment of the fine."
Id. at 472.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 470 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b)-(c) (West 2021)).
70. Id. at 472.
71. Id. at 473-76.
72. Id. at 476-77.
73. 437 A.2d 324 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
74. See id. at 325.
75. See id.
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1961 decision discussing Morissette.76 The defendant, however, pointed to
the 1979 adoption of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, providing that
"[a] statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to
impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime with mental
culpability. This provision applies to offenses defined both within and outside
of this code." 7 7 The Kiejdan court, relying on the regulatory function of the
ordinance and pre-Code judicial decisions imposing strict liability for similar
laws, concluded that "[w]e have no doubt as to the clarity of the legislative
intent" to impose strict liability.7 8
When confronted with a constitutional challenge to a strict liability
ordinance, state courts tend to use the Morissette line of cases in one of two
ways, finding that the ordinance raises no constitutional problem because
either (1) it defines a public welfare offense, or (2) since it is not a public
welfare offense, it can be interpreted as requiring culpability.
The first alternative is illustrated by a case from Iowa, a state with no
statutory default rules. The defendant was convicted of violating various
criminal parking ordinances promulgated by Iowa City and fined twenty
dollars. 79 The offense that was most extensively analyzed by the court was a
provision that created strict vicarious liability for the registered owner of a
vehicle if that vehicle was found to be parked past the given time limit.80 The
court held that parking offenses are "clearly within a permissible area of
regulation in the interest of people's lives and property," and therefore fall
within Morissette's "public welfare" exception to the mens rea
presumption.8 Even parking can implicate public danger, the court reasoned,
because "an illegally parked vehicle on a downtown street during rush hour
can seriously endanger pedestrian and vehicular travel." 2
The second alternative is illustrated by the 1993 Arizona case of State v.
Crisp, upholding the charge of "[s]olicit[ing] . . an act of prostitution" under
a Phoenix city ordinance. 83 The defendant had been convicted under this
ordinance without an instruction requiring proof that he had intended to

76. See id. at 325 (citing State v. Chiarello, 174 A.2d 506, 514 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1961)).
77. Id. at 326 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 1979) (amended 1981)).
78. Id. at 326.
79. Iowa City v. Nolan, 239 N.W.2d 102, 102-03 (Iowa 1976).
80. Id. at 103.
81. Id. at 105.
82. Id. This rationale does not apply, of course, to the offense of parking past the allotted
time in an otherwise designated spot. The court ignored this or failed to appreciate it.
83. 855 P.2d 795, 796 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting PHX., ARiz., CiTY CODE § 23-52(a)(2)
(1993)).
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solicit prostitution. 84 The defense argued the ordinance imposed strict liability
in violation of due process, and condemned it as overbroad and vague. 85
Neither agreeing the statute imposed strict liability, nor approving strict
liability, a lower appellate court had instead awarded defendant a new trial to
consider his intent. 86 This ruling seemed consistent with the 1978 criminal
code, which applied to offenses in other statutes, and provided that an offense
definition mentioning no culpable mental state should be presumed to impose
strict liability "unless the proscribed conduct necessarily involves a culpable
mental state." 87 The lower court reasoned that "solicitation" implied such an
intent."0 Rather than invoking the Code's interpretive rules, however, the
Court of Appeals cited a pre-Code case endorsing "the general rule
that . . . mens rea is required" and stated that "this court may infer the scienter
requirement from the words of the statute plus legislative intent."8 9 That
decision in turn relied on a 1968 case, citing Morissette.90 The Court of
Appeals in Crispconcluded that the lower appellate court had properly given
the statute a saving construction. 9 1
Finally, consider the 1983 Colorado case of City of Englewood v.
Hammes.92 The defendant was convicted by a municipal court of "interfering
with [a police] officer" after approaching officers to observe their arrest of
his roommate and urging them not to hurt him. 93 A county court reversed on
the ground that the ordinance unconstitutionally imposed liability without
requiring proof of an intent to interfere. 94 However, the Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed the reversal on a different ground: "We limit the ordinance to
knowing conduct, and as limited, uphold it as constitutional. However,
because there was no evidence that the defendant knowingly interfered with
police officers, we affirm the result reached by the district court. 95 Drawing
on the Morissette progeny case of UnitedStates v. U.S. Gypsum Co., the court
observed that "a mens rea is the rule . . of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence." 96 And while strict liability crimes could be used to regulate
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
1968)).
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id.
Id. at 797-98.
See id. at 796.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(b) (1978).
Crisp, 855 P.2d at 796.
Id. at 797 (quoting State v. Mincey, 566 P.2d 273, 279 (Ariz. 1977)).
Mincey, 566 P.2d at 279 (citing State v. Cutshaw, 437 P.2d 962, 973 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Crisp, 855 P.2d at 797.
671 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1983).
Id. at 948-49 (quoting ENGLEWOOD, COLO., MUNICIPAL CODE § 11-6-15 (1980)).
Id. at 950.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 952 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978)).
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dangerous activities, "[t]hose strict liability statutes which potentially abut
upon constitutional freedoms must be narrowly drawn to avoid vagueness
and overbreadth problems." 97 Because obstructing an officer was a
common law rather than a regulatory offense, implicated speech interests,
and "necessarily contain[ed] an element of mens rea which may be read
into the ordinance," the court construed the ordinance "to require a mental
state of 'knowingly."' 98 In using the term "necessarily" and citing the 1981
Colorado case of Bollier v. People, the court invoked the applicable state
code provision permitting it to require culpability "necessarily involve[d]"
in the act element. 99 But by also citing U.S. Gypsum and using the
Morissette framework to reach a saving construction of mens rea, the court
honored mens rea as a constitutional value, without insisting it is a
constitutional requirement.

C. Lenity?
One doctrine that plays perhaps surprisingly little role in the construction
of strict liability local offenses is the rule of lenity, the canon requiring that
criminal statutes be strictly construed against the state.' Indeed, lenity plays
little role in the criminal law of most states. 0 ' Observers aware of the
well-documented decline of lenity in federal criminal jurisprudence over the
last half century might assume its small role in state jurisprudence similarly
reflects the ideological ascendance of the war on crime.0 2
Yet the minor role of lenity in state criminal law has an earlier source. As
Professor Zachary Price observed, "Many state legislatures have passed
statutes abrogating strict construction or urging alternative interpretive
priorities."' 0 3 Indeed, twelve state codes explicitly reject lenity. 0 4 Another
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Bollier v. People, 635 P.2d 543, 545 (Colo. 1981)).
99. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-103, -503(2) (2021). Section 18-1-103 authorizes the use of
section 18-1-503(2). See § 18-1-103.
100. Shon Hopwood, Restoring the HistoricalRule ofLenity as a Canon, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV.
918, 920-21 (2020).
101. Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885,
901-06 (2004).
102. See Hopwood, supra note 100, at 920-21. For varying accounts of the politics of the
war on crime, see generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010); JOHN PFAFF,
LOCKED IN (2017); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME (2007); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ,
THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).

103. Price, supranote 101, at 886.
104. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-101, -104 (2021); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 2021);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 201, 203 (2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 446.080(1), 500.030 (West

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

440

[Ariz. St. L.J.

thirteen implicitly do so by requiring interpretation to effectuate their code's
stated purposes,' 5 and three more do so simply by enumerating such
purposes.1 06 Price suggested that these code provisions might indicate "that
legislatures prefer expansive readings,"1 07 but they more likely reflect the
influence of Model Penal Code section 1.02, which follows a statement of
purposes with this admonition: "The provisions of the Code shall be
construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language
is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the
general purposes stated in this Section and the special purposes of the
particular provision involved."1 08 These purposes included such lenient aims
as "to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as
criminal;"1 09 "to give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to
constitute an offense;""o "to differentiate on reasonable grounds between
serious and minor offenses;""' and "to safeguard offenders against excessive,
disproportionate or arbitrary punishment."" 2 The commentary explains:
The ancient rule that penal law must be strictly construed, found in
many American penal codes, is not preserved as such because it
unduly emphasized only one aspect of the problem that the courts
must face. Instead, Subsections (1)(d) and (2)(d) affirm that fair
warning is one of the major purposes to be served. Construction of
ambiguous statutes in terms that strike an accommodation of the
general principles here set forth . . is a far more desirable charge."1 3

Thus, the decline of lenity in state criminal law reflects not a recent
determination of legislatures to expand criminal liability but an earlier
commitment to confine liability by defining offenses systematically. It seems
2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.2 (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-1-102(2) (2021); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 625:3 (2021); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1.05, 5.00 (McKinney 2021); OR. REV. STAT.
§161.025 (2021); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 104, 105 (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-1 (2021);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.02, .05 (West 2021).
105. ALA. CODE § 13A-1-3, -6 (2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-102 (2021); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 701-103, -104 (2021); IND. CODE § 35-32-1-1 (2021); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:3 (2021);
MINN. STAT. § 609.01 (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-102 (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.030
(2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-2 (West 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-02 (2021); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-11-101, -104 (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-104 (West 2021); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9A.04.020 (2021).
106. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.100 (2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-2 (2021); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/1-2 (2021).
107. Price, supranote 101, at 886.
108. MODEL PENAL CODE

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§

1.02(3) (AM. L. INST. 1985).

§ 1.02(1)(c).
§ 1.02(1)(d).
§ 1.02(1)(e).
§ 1.02(2)(c).
§ 1.02 cmt. 4, at 32-33 (footnotes omitted).
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the Model Penal Code's hierarchy of mental states and culpability default
rules was part of a drafting strategy intended to obviate lenity and achieve its
ends by other means. But in the many states without systematic culpability
schemes in their state codes, the rule of lenity is a resource courts can, and
arguably should, apply in constructing the mental elements of local offenses.

II.

PREEMPTION

There is a second doctrine often at play when a court reviews a local
offense: preemption by state law. In general, most states adopt the major
analytical categories of preemption created by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
federal preemption context: express preemption and implied preemption (due
to "conflict" or "occupation of the field")." 4 The Court's own description of
these doctrines is worth quoting in full:
It is well-established that within Constitutional limits Congress may
preempt state authority by so stating in express terms. Absent
explicit preemptive language, Congress' intent to supercede [sic]
state law altogether may be found from a "scheme of federal
regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room to supplement it," "because the Act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject," or because the
"object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character
of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose." Even
where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a
specific area, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when "compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,"
or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."115

From these analytic baselines, State courts have added substantial variation.
In what follows, we shall discuss how these courts interpret implied
preemption; express preemption, after all, is easy to recognize and hard to
ignore, and therefore reveals less about the role of expert judges in the
application of local offenses to real cases.

114. See Dinh, supra note 12, at 2100-07 (discussing federal categories); see also Diller
supra note 11, at 1140-42 (citing state law and noting that "[d]espite some superficial distinctions,
most states' preemption analyses are similar in form to the federal model").
115. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
203-04 (1983) (cleaned up).
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A. Conflict Preemption: "ProhibitPermit"and "More Stringent"

'

In the context of relations between states and localities, state courts have
substantially elaborated the concept of conflict preemption. Many states
interpret this to mean that a conflict arises when a local ordinance prohibits
that which state law permits or if the ordinance permits that which state law
prohibits. Local government law scholar Paul Diller calls this the
"prohibit/permit" test."6
Since criminal law almost always speaks in the form of a prohibition,
though, a local offense could only be preempted under the generic
"prohibit/permit" test if the absence of a state offense on point were somehow
interpreted to constitute "permission" by the legislature to engage in the
non-criminalized conduct. In other words, any conduct not made criminal is
viewed as permissible. While some states have taken this "extreme" position,
this does not appear to be widely held, and for good reason-it is
incompatible with home rule powers that include criminalization." As the
Oregon Supreme Court observed:
Statutes defining crimes normally are not written in terms of
permitted conduct; they normally are written to prohibit conduct. If
the criminal statutes of Oregon are interpreted to permit all conduct
not prohibited . .. it would bar all local governments from
legislation in the area of criminal law unless the local legislation
was identical to its state counterpart.1"8

Thus, Oregon's approach (shared by some other states) finds "permission"
only when it is expressed or when "legislative intent to permit that conduct is
otherwise apparent."11'
116. Diller, supra note 11, at 1142. Diller is highly critical of the test. Id. ("[It] is a
fundamentally flawed approach that creates tremendous confusion for courts and litigants.
'Prohibit/permit,' in its most extreme form, is an argument almost shocking in its sophistic
simplicity; nonetheless, litigants challenging local ordinances frequently rely upon it.")
117. See id. at 1142-43. South Carolina's high court employed this interpretation most often.
See Beachfront Ent., Inc. v. Town of Sullivan's Island, 666 S.E.2d 912, 914 (S.C. 2008)
(preempting ordinance that barred smoking in workplace because "it conflicts with State criminal
law by imposing a criminal penalty for conduct that is not illegal under State law"); see also
Palmetto Princess, LLC v. Town of Edisto Beach, 631 S.E.2d 76, 77-78 (S.C. 2006) (applying
the same reasoning to preempt an ordinance prohibiting possession of gambling devices on a
vessel); Diamonds v. Greenville Cnty., 480 S.E.2d 718, 719-20 (S.C. 1997) (applying the same
reasoning to preempt an ordinance prohibiting public nudity); Connor v. Town of Hilton Head
Island, 442 S.E.2d 608, 609, 611 (S.C. 1994) (applying the same reasoning with respect to an
ordinance prohibiting nude barroom dancing).
118. City of Portland v. Jackson, 850 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Or. 1993).
119. Id. at 1096. The court upheld a local ordinance that imposed strict liability for public
exposure, while the analogous state statute required "intent of arousing the sexual desire of the
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'

But many states have created a further elaboration of the "prohibit/permit"
test to "escape the anti-local conclusions" the "extreme" position would lead
to an interpretation of the test that Diller calls the "more stringent" test.'
This version holds thatthere will be no "prohibit/permit"conflict preemption
if the local ordinance is "more stringent" in its regulation than is state law.' 2
For criminal offenses, this means that the local offense must punish more
conduct than does the analogous state offense-not less. This is true if new
offenses are invented that no state offense seems to cover, or if a mens rea
element is lowered from a more culpable mental state to a less culpable one
(thus covering more instances of the given conduct). Two examples are worth
discussing.
In Junction City v. Lee, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a local
ordinance that punished possession of handguns and firearms in a broader set
of circumstances than did an analogous state law. 2 2 The ordinance prohibited
"knowingly . . [c]arrying on one's person . . [a] dangerous knife . . or . .
any pistol, revolver, or other firearm."123 The state statute prohibited
"knowingly . . carrying concealed on one's person, or possessing with intent
to use the same unlawfully against another . .. [a] dangerous knife . .. or . .
any pistol, revolver or other firearm concealed on the person." 2 4 Thus, the
local ordinance eliminated the statute's requirement that the knife be
concealed and possessed for an unlawful purpose, and the requirement that
the firearm be concealed. 2 5 The defendant in the case was found in a used car
lot with a revolver and a knife both strapped visibly to his belt, and stated at
trial that he possessed the weapon in the lot for the purpose of "plinking."' 2 6
Were either the concealment or the unlawful intent elements imposed, as

person or another person" because no legislative history indicated permission for non-sexually
motivated exposure. Id. at 1097-99; see also State v. Tyler, 7 P.3d 624, 626 (Or. 2000) ("The
state's policy decision to decriminalize all minor traffic infractions, including pedestrian
violations, forecloses the city's decision to impose criminal penalties for comparable, even if not
identical, offenses."); State v. Crawley, 447 A.2d 565, 567 (N.J. 1982) (explaining that doctrine
of "preemption by exclusion" from state criminal code applied if a court could "infer legislative
intent from the overall structure of the Penal Code and its legislative history" to "decriminalize
that conduct"); Thomas v. State, 614 So.2d 468, 470 (Fla. 1993) ("A city may not enact an
ordinance imposing criminal penalties for conduct essentially identical to that which has been
decriminalized by the state.").
120. Diller, supra note 11, at 1145-46.
121. Id. at 1146.
122. 532 P.2d 1292, 1297-98 (Kan. 1975).
123. Id. at 1296 (quoting JUNCTION CITY, KAN., CODE OF ORDINANCES No. G-360 (1973)
(superseded 1980) (repealed 2015)).
124. Id. at 1297 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4201(1)(b), (d) (repealed 2011)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1294.
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required by state law, the defendant would not have committed an offense.'
Because the ordinance was broader, though, the court held that it was not
preempted.'2 8 "The ordinance eliminates [the state law] elements and is thus
more restrictive, more stringent," the court observed, and when "the
ordinance goes further in its prohibition but not counter to the prohibition in
the statute . . . there is no conflict."1 2 9
Another example is Kansas City v. LaRose, a decision by the Missouri
Supreme Court upholding a local ordinance punishing interference with a
police officer.' 3 0 The ordinance prohibited "hinder[ing], obstruct[ing],
molest[ing], resist[ing], or otherwise interfer[ing] with" a police officer
acting pursuant to his or her official duties.' 3 ' The closest state law offense
on point prohibited that the same conduct be "knowingly and willfully"
committed.1 32 The defendant, a mother, prevented officers from entering her
home without a warrant to arrest her teenage son for alleged disorderly
conduct after he randomly shouted obscenities at a police officer who drove
by.1 33 While the court later held that the officers were permitted to enter a
home without a warrant when in hot pursuit of a suspect that committed an
offense in their presence, the defendant of course did not appear to have
"knowledge" with respect to her hindrance of a lawful police action. 3 4 But
her claim that she "had no actual knowledge that she had a duty to admit the

127. See id. at 1297.
128. Id. at 1297-99.
129. Id. The court also seemed to find that there was a rational basis for broadening liability
here based on unique local circumstances.
Evaluation of the wisdom or necessity of the Junction City enactment of a
weapons control ordinance more rigid than statutory law is not within our
province, although the city fathers undoubtedly were aware of the fact that in
situations where passions or tempers suddenly flare easy accessibility of
weapons, whether carried openly or concealed, may contribute to an increased
number of fatalities, and furtherthat theirown problem is rendered more acute
by the presence of an adjoining military reservation from whence combat
troops trained in the use of handguns and knives sometimes repair to the city
during off-duty hours. In an earlier era the cowboy entering the Kansas
cowtown was frequently requiredto deposit his gunbelt with the marshal. We
conclude conflict in terms or language between the parts of the ordinance and
the state statute does not exist.
Id. at 1298.
130. 524 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. 1975).
131. Id. at 116 (quoting KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES

§ 26.35 (1967) (current

version at § 50-44(a))).
132. Id. (quoting Mo. REV. STAT.
133. Id. at 115.
134. Id. at 119-20.

§ 557.210 (1969) (repealed 1977)).
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officers" was rebuffed.1 35 While the court reasoned thatignorance of criminal
procedure law was no excuse, the irrelevance of her mental state was a
foregone conclusion given that the mens rea elements of "knowingly and
willfully" in the state statute were expressly omitted from the local
ordinance.1 36 This was permissible, according to the court, under the "more
stringent" preemption test:
While, as stated, the statute requires that the act be knowingly and
willfully done and the ordinance does not contain those words, we
have concluded that no conflict exists which would invalidate the
ordinance. It is clear that any violation of the statute would also be
a violation of the ordinance. In that regard they are entirely
consistent. The ordinance has simply gone further and prohibited
interference in cases where [willfulness] is not shown.1 37

Reducing the culpable mental state required for liability, or eliminating it
altogether, saves the local offense from being invalidated by conflict
preemption.
Finally, some jurisdictions will find that a local offense is
conflict-preempted not because of the conduct it covers but because of the
punishment it metes out. These jurisdictions allow for ordinances that punish
the same or less than their state law analogues, but not those that punish more
severely. 138 One example can be found in the Florida Supreme Court's
analysis of a preemption claim in Wyche v. State. 13 The defendant was
convicted of "loitering for the purpose of prostitution," an offense created by
the city of Tampa that carried a maximum punishment of six months'
imprisonment. 14 Because this exceeded the maximum punishment allowed
by the analogous state law offenses (sixty days), the court found conflict
preemption: "Conflict arises when municipalities punish misconduct more
severely than is permitted by state statutes.""4

135. Id. at 120.
136. Id. at 117, 120.
137. Id. at 117.
138. Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231, 238 (Fla. 1993); City of Fargo v. Little Brown Jug, 468
N.W.2d 392, 396 (N.D. 1991) ("[T]he penalty of a municipal ordinance may differ from the
penalty imposed by the state law [only if] the municipality authorizes imposition of up to the
maximum allowable municipal penalty which is lesser thanthe state law penalty for an equivalent
statute."). But see State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (Ohio 2001) ("It is true that a municipal
ordinance may proscribe the same conduct as a state criminal statute and impose a penalty greater
thanthe state criminal code imposes.").
139. 619 So.2d at 233.
140. Id. at 233, 237.
141. Id. at 237-38.
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B. FieldPreemption
A second version of preemption that is also implicated by local criminal
laws is field preemption-when a substantive area of regulation is intended
to be completely taken over or "occupied" by the state offenses relating to
that area.1 42 Recall the Supreme Court's description of this in the federal
context: a "scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it."1 43
Given that all states have codes of criminal law, one might think of this
subject matter as a "field" that could be "occupied" entirely. The New Jersey
Supreme Court came close to taking this position in the 1982 case State v.
Crawley.144 In Crawley, the city of Newark had enacted a local offense
punishing loitering defined as "remaining idle in essentially one place."1 45
While relying in part on legislative history indicating an intent to
decriminalize loitering-type conduct (and rejecting the more stringent test),1 4 6
the court went further and applied field preemption principles, asking "Was
the state law intended expressly or impliedly to be exclusive in the field?" 47
Noting that the state criminal code contained numerous provisions relating to
disorderly conduct and breaches of peace, the court concluded that this
category of conduct was occupied by state regulation. 148 The justification for
field preemption here was the comprehensive aspiration of the state's
criminal code reform efforts:
The Code of Criminal Justice itself manifests both a "clear design
for uniform statewide treatment" and a "complete system of
law" .... The Legislature's central purpose in enacting the Penal
Code was to create a consistent, comprehensive system of criminal
law. The Legislature stated these goals in . . . the statute that
established the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission:
"It shall be the purpose of [the Code of Criminal Justice] to
modernize the criminal law of this State so as to embody principles
142. Diller, supra note 11, at 1153-57.
143. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
203-04 (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'nv. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
144. 447 A.2d 565, 571 (N.J. 1982).
145. Id. at 569-70, 570 n.4 (quoting NEWARK, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES § 17:2-14 (1966)
(repealed 2009)).
146. Id. at 568 (describing concerns with loitering ordinances following the Papachristou
case and reasoning that the legislature likely intended to decriminalize the conduct because of its
questionable constitutionality). "Relying on such principles, the State argues that chapter 33 of
the Code establishes only minimum statewide regulation of loitering-related activities, that
N.R.O. 17:2-14 complements the state law, and therefore, that the Newark ordinance should be
viewed as permissible local supplementation of state legislation. We disagree." Id. at 570.
147. Id. at 569.
148. Id. at 569-70.
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representing the best in modern statutory law, to eliminate
inconsistencies,
ambiguities,
outmoded
and conflicting,
overlappingand redundantprovisions and to revise and codify the
law in a logical, clear and concise manner. "149

While this comprehensive aspiration would appear to preclude any criminal
offense creation by localities, the court did not mean "comprehensive" in the
literal sense. Instead, it seems that the state code is "comprehensive" only
with respect to categories of conduct that it addresses. Thus, the court wrote
that legislature did not intend to "leave this area of criminal law to a
patchwork of municipal criminal regulations," and expressly stated that
localities could create criminal offenses to prohibit loitering-type harms "by
provisions of local ordinances dealing with property offenses, vandalism,
pollution and public health." 5 1
This limited version of comprehensiveness-comprehensive within a
"field" of conduct subject to criminal regulation, and not all criminal
regulation-appears to be the typical interpretation and application of field
preemption. Consider a 1989 decision by the Supreme Court of Kentucky,
Piercev. Commonwealth.'5 ' A locality in Kentucky created a criminal offense
punishing solicitation of sodomy: "It shall be a criminal offense for a person
to solicit, invite, influence or encourage another person by speech, gesture,
or any other form of communication, to engage in or attempt to engage in
[sodomy] . . . with the intent to promote or facilitate such conduct."1 2 This
contrasted with the state law offense of solicitation in general: "A person is
guilty of criminal solicitation when, with the intent of promoting or
facilitating the commission of a crime, he commands or encourages another
person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute that
crime .... "153 By adding the possibility of liability for "gesture[s]" and
"other form[s] of communication," the ordinance defined the sodomy
solicitation offense "more broadly" than the state offense. 4 Without
explicitly using the term "field preemption," the court struck down the local
ordinance using this form of reasoning (and in the process, rejecting a "more

149. Id. at 570.
150. Id. (emphasis added). This seems strange, though, because presumably there are state
offenses regarding this conduct as well. The Supreme Court of New Jersey thus uses
"comprehensive" here in a confusing manner.
151. 777 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Ky. 1989).
152. Id. at 927-28 (emphasis omitted)
153. Id. at 927 (emphasis omitted).
154. Id. at 928.
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stringent" test).' Because the ordinance "directly addresse[d] criminal
conduct which is comprehensively addressed by state statutes," it was
preempted.1 56 The general criminal solicitation offense in state law, then, was
"comprehensive" with respect to all solicitation-type offenses, regardless of
subject matter.' The court did note that it thought the breadth with which
the ordinance was drafted had the potential to include within its applicability
some innocent conduct: "We are also concerned that under the expansive
language of the ordinance there is a possibility that an inadvertent act would
appear to be a violation when in fact it is but an innocent behavioral
idiosyncrasy.""'
III.

JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO ASYMMETRY

Now thatwe betterunderstand the doctrinal tools available to judges when
confronted with a strict liability local offense, we can assess which of these
tools can help to fix the mistakes made by the locality. Certain doctrines can
be seen as ameliorative, in thatthey work to reinforce the benefits of modern
offense drafting when a local legislature fails to draft in a modern way
itself."' However, contemporary doctrine imposes important limits on how
ameliorative either mens rea construction or preemption can be.

A. ConstructingMens Rea
First, consider how the doctrine of mens rea construction typically
interacts with harmful asymmetry. The most prevalent form of the test asks,
after applying a factor test, whether the legislature actually "intended" for the
offense to create strict liability even absent an express mental element.1 60
Most significant is whether the offense is a traditional malum in se offense
(in which case mens rea is required) or a newer offense aimed at regulating
155. "As the General Assembly chose the language used in the statute, we must conclude it
did so intentionally and we cannot approve an ordinance which amounts to an enlargement of the
conduct proscribed by the act of the General Assembly." Id. The court was also very concerned
with the excessive penalty. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id. "Thus the ordinance enacted by the City of Florence directly addresses criminal
conduct which is comprehensively addressed by state statutes." Id.
158. Id.
159. Only implied preemption will be discussed. This is because when a state legislature
expressly preempts a local criminal offense, the application of the doctrine is simple, and also
reveals little about the role of the judiciary. State judges are merely vehicles of the implementation
of legislative will in these cases. In analyzing implied preemption, the "more stringent" and
"field" versions of implied preemption are discussed because they appear to be the most prevalent.
160. Brown, supra note 1, at 315-16 & n.118.
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conduct harmful to "public welfare."' 6 ' This doctrine, when it applies, is
somewhat ameliorative of harmful asymmetry: it results in a judicial
rewriting of an archaic local offense to look more like a modern offense by
the grafting on of a mens rea requirement. Recall the Supreme Court of
Colorado's opinion in Hammes, discussed earlier, in which the court rewrote
a local strict liability offense punishing "interfer[ing] with or hinder[ing] [a
police officer] in the discharge of his duty." 6 2 Because the conduct covered
by the ordinance originated in "common law" and could include protected
speech, the court imputed a mental state of "knowingly."' 6 3
At least in the category of offenses that trigger construction of mens rea,
then, this doctrine is ameliorative of harmful asymmetries in criminal offense
drafting. The doctrine does nothing, though, to help the defendant who is
prosecuted for a local "regulatory" or "public welfare"-type offense-and
this is likely a very large category of local offenses. Consider the plight of
the landlord-defendant in Kiejdan convicted of failure to maintain a certain
temperature in his apartment units (caused not by his negligence, but by
others' vandalism of the heater). 6 4 Because this offense is of the type that
fails to trigger mens rea construction, this doctrine will be of no help.

B. Preemption
Now, consider how preemption doctrine will apply in a harmful
asymmetry scenario. In such a case, a state court will compare a local offense
written in the archaic form and an analogous state offense written in the
modern form, and ask whether the local offense is "more stringent" than the
state offense, or whether the state legislature had "occupied the field" in that
area of conduct.
When applying the "more stringent" implied conflict preemption doctrine
in a harmful asymmetry scenario, the doctrine can do little work to ameliorate
the problems created by the asymmetry. Because the local offense is written
in the archaic form, it is likely to have no mens rea, while the analogous state
offense will be written and interpreted using the Model Penal Code method
of element analysis. Since a strict liability offense is by definition "more
stringent" than an offense with a required level of culpability (the strict
liability offense is broader and includes more conduct), conflict preemption
is of no help to the jurist or court aiming to displace a poorly drafted local
161. Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare
Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 313, 344-45, 350-51 (2003).
162. City of Englewood v. Hammes, 671 P.2d 947, 953 n.1 (Colo. 1983).
163. Id. at 952.
164. State v. Kiejdan, 437 A.2d 324, 325 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).

450

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

offense with a well-drafted state offense. Recall the Missouri Supreme Court
case of LaRose discussed above. 165 Missouri, a modern-code state, punished
"knowingly and willfully" interfering with a police officer, while a local
ordinance punished "hinder[ing], obstruct[ing], molest[ing], resist[ing], or
otherwise interfer[ing] with" a police officer without reference to a
culpability requirement.166 Applying the "more stringent" test, the court
upheld the ordinance because it had "simply gone further and prohibited
interference" without willfulness.' 67 Implied conflict preemption was unable
to ameliorate harmful asymmetry in offense drafting.
Application of the field preemption doctrine, though, would be
ameliorative in this class of cases. Successful field preemption claims result
in entire categories of criminalized conduct being walled off from local
regulatory innovation.' 68 When a state has promulgated a modern criminal
code, and a locality has promulgated an archaic offense, this is a good thing.
An example of this judicial amelioration in action is the New Jersey Supreme
Court case discussed earlier, Crawley.169 The City of Newark enacted an
archaic-type loitering ordinance punishing "loitering," defined as "remaining
idle in essentially one place . .. spending time idly, loafing or walking about
aimlessly, [or] ... hanging around."170 New Jersey, a modern-code state,
punished similar conduct but defined it with precision and with a mental
state.17' Applying field preemption, the New Jersey Supreme Court
invalidated the local offense, noting the goal of a "comprehensive system of
criminal law" in the state.' 72 The Court also quoted the state code revision
commission's mission to "embody principles representing the best in modern
statutory law, to eliminate inconsistencies, ambiguities, outmoded and
conflicting, overlapping and redundant provisions and to revise and codify

165. Kansas City v. LaRose, 524 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. 1975).
166. Id. at 116.
167. Id. at 117.
168. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227 (2000) (defining field
preemption).
169. State v. Crawley, 447 A.2d 565, 571 (N.J. 1982).
170. Id. at 570 n.4.
171. See id. at 567-68 (citing multiple New Jersey statutes). For example:
A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to
cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
thereof he (1) [e]ngages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous
behavior; or (2) [c]reates a hazardous or physically dangerous condition by
any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:33-2 (West 2021).
172. Id. at 570.
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the law in a logical, clear and concise manner."1 73 In other words, a robust
use of field preemption can ameliorate the problems of harmful asymmetry,
displacing archaic local offenses with modern state offenses.

CONCLUSION

Strict liability ordinances are widespread in local criminal law, but given
the doctrines available, the power of judges to "fix" this problem is not
absolute. Field preemption is the strongest response, with the most potential
for reintroducing mens rea, but it requires making a claim that local law
concerning a category of conduct is completely displaced-something judges
may be reluctant to do. Similarly, mens rea construction can do the valuable
work of bringing culpability requirements back into archaic local law, but the
factor test most often applied to determine whether or not mens rea is
constructed is itself indeterminate. Courts reach for the factor test for a variety
of reasons, including the lack of default rules (in some states), the legislative
intent exception to statutory presumptions of culpability (in others), or as a
safe harbor from due process challenges (in some cases). The value of this
doctrine will therefore depend on how and why courts apply the test. Least
useful is the doctrine of conflict preemption: modern state offenses will not
preempt an archaic strict liability local offense if the test for conflict
preemption is whether the local offense is "more stringent," as strict liability
offenses cover more conduct than do offenses requiring culpability. Overall,
we conclude that judges can play a valuable role in the response to strict
liability local ordinances, but neither their capacity nor their will to do so
should be presumed.

173. Id.

